Securing the access to a server, guaranteeing a certain level of protection over an encrypted communication channel, executing particular counter measures when attacks are detected are examples of security requirements. Such requirements are identied based on organizational purposes and expectations in terms of resource access and availability and also on system vulnerabilities and threats. All these requirements belong to the so-called security policy. Deploying the policy means enforcing, i.e., conguring, those security components and mechanisms so that the system behavior be nally the one specied by the policy. The deployment issue becomes more dicult as the growing organizational requirements and expectations generally leave behind the integration of new security functionalities in the information system: the information system will not always embed the necessary security functionalities for the proper deployment of contextual security requirements. To overcome this issue, our solution is based on a central entity approach which takes in charge unmanaged contextual requirements and dynamically redeploys the policy when context changes are detected by this central entity.
Introduction
The conguration of network security components, such as rewalls, intrusion detection systems, and VPN routers, must guarantee the appropriate enforcement of a security policy. This involves building up an abstract model of the security requirements expected to be enforced over the system. This model must provide to the security ocer the appropriate means to deploy over the system the set of actions that every subject is authorized to perform. Therefore, the deployment of the policy over the system means enforcing (i.e., conguring) the security devices that must guarantee the proper behavior dened by the policy. Additionally, there is always the hypothesis that all the functionalities necessary to enforce a given policy are present and enabled in these devices. As long as the contextual aspect is not dealt with, such a hypothesis is acceptable: the security requirements are not dynamic and, therefore, all the security devices may be enforced once and for all at the system initialization. The unaccomplished security requirements are detected from the very beginning, e.g., in an o-line manner. This may be the result of a decient or missing functionality on the security device. The solution is trivial: the cost of the faulty device is evaluated against assurance requirements and the security ocer may proceed to an update or an upgrade. However, security policies become more and more contextual and, consequently, more complex. There is a real risk that some security requirements still remain unaccomplished: either the cost of some new security functionalities is unacceptable or the security devices cannot be frequently updated with such new functionalities.
We present a solution to this problem. We propose a mechanism for the dynamic renement of contextual security policies over systems where security devices do not understand, or are not allowed, to deal with the semantics of contexts. Our approach works as follows. The security requirements are modeled based on an extended RBAC access control model which provides means to specify contextual security requirements. We take our inspiration in the OrBAC (Organization-Based Access Control) model [1] . The input of the renement process is (1) the formal policy, (2) the system architecture, and (3) the device capabilities or functionalities. Then, as a result of context activation, not only enforcing the security devices but also changes of their congurations are carried out in an automatic manner. Our contribution is threefold. First, it enhances the OrBAC model by integrating concepts from action specication languages, in order to allow reasoning about policy state evolution as soon as actions are detected. Second, it allows security ocers to rene contextual policies over security devices that are either not capable or not allowed to interpret the contextual data. Third, it benets policybased mitigation scenarios, such as those used by intrusion detection, fault tolerance, and quality of service processes, in which a policy reconguration process must follow the detection mechanism that identied a given event.
Paper organization Section 2 addresses our motivation. Section 3 surveys related work. Section 4 establishes the core elements of our approach. Section 5 provides the formal denition of our proposal and illustrates a concrete context-aware network scenario build upon our construction. Section 6 presents a practical validation of our approach based on existing tools. Section 7 discusses some open problems and limitations of our proposal. Section 8 concludes the paper.
Motivation of our Construction
Our work is placed in the PBNM (Policy Based Network Management) area. The security architecture of a policy-based managed system generally integrates the following entities: the PDP (Policy Decision Point) and several PEPs (Policy Enforcement Points). We consider the PDP as the central and intelligent entity in the network. Based on the security policy data and some algorithms, the PDP decides upon the access control in the network. Decisions taken by the PDP must be unambiguous. Given the possible inconsistencies in dening a security policy (i.e., rule conicts), the PDP may include a conict resolution mechanism which consequently guarantees the consistency of the policy. The PEP, a security device, is the operational entity in the network which enforces the decisions of the PDP. Examples of PEPs are network rewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), and VPN routers for the construction of IPsec tunnels. There are two modes of interaction between PEPs and PDP both delegating the responsibility for a decision to the PDP: (1) provisioning mode where the PDP, reacting to dierent inputs (and PEP queries), proactively provisions the PEP and (2) outsourcing mode: when the PEP receives a query, it contacts the PDP which makes a decision, meaning that there is a one-to-one correlation between PEP events and PDP decisions. Experiments show that the provisioning mode performs better than the outsourcing mode [22] .
The decision made by the PDP generally depends on the activation of some contexts. The concept of context [10, 36] is used here within the specication of security rules which are then triggered when the context becomes active. We list next some examples of contexts. A more complete taxonomy of contexts modeling techniques can be found in [13] .
• Temporal context It depends on the time at which a subject is requesting for an access to the system. For example, common Cisco routers with time-based ACLs (Access Control Lists) may be considered examples of PEPs able to deal with the temporal context if and only if the time intervals do not have a very ne granularity (e.g., seconds);
• Spatial context It depends on the subject location. This may be the case of IPv6 mobility: given the risk of a Denial of Service (DoS) attack in MIPv6 (Mobile IPv6), specic security rules can be deployed once new binding updates are detected [rfc 3775];
• Session context It depends on the establishment of negotiation parameters, such as network ports or IP addresses. For example, on VoIP (Voice Over IP) applications, the negotiation of randomly chosen UDP ports and/or IP addresses may aect the ltering process of rewalls that are not aware of such parameters. New functionalities like those of SBC (Session Border Controler) partially solve these issues. However, often the same session policy is applied for all users and this may prove unacceptable regarding users requirements.
• Intrusion context It species security rules to be activated as a response to an intrusion. For example, a certain IP packet with a specic payload, and related to a known attack, triggers the activation of an intrusion context. This results in an IDS alert which, in turn, may have been dened as the activating event of a reaction context.
A reaction context may be related, for example, to the deployment of certain rewall rules in order to isolate the victim of the attack;
• User-declared context It depends on the subject objective (or purpose). For example, a certain IP trac is not allowed unless the corresponding IP packets are encapsulated in an IPsec tunnel; therefore the IPsec tunnel parameters are part of a context denition (e.g., authentication type and encryption algorithms).
The contextual techniques modeled in [13] are, however, passive. Indeed, a controller based on such contextual OrBAC model assumes policy evaluation triggered by access requests. It does not allow reasoning about policy state evolution when actions are observed by the system. We aim to enhance the model in order to overcome this limitation. Moreover, let us also observe that PEPs do not necessarily have to provide the functionalities to process the contextual semantics (e.g., spatial, session or intrusion contextual data). It is, hence, fair to consider situations in which the enforcement of contexts by PEPs may prove unsatisfactory for performance reasons; or situations in which some particular contexts containing sensitive data must not be handled by the PEPs. We aim to investigate how to deploy contextual policies related to the provisioning mode when, at least, a PEP is not capable, or allowed, to enforce context-aware policies.
Related Work

Access Control Models
The security policy of an information system may include a wide range of different requirements, such as authentication, authorization, information ow, and usage control requirements. Specifying administration and delegation policies is also a more and more important issue, especially in the context of pervasive distributed systems. The objective of using a security policy is to represent in an abstract model the set of real-world requirements that are meant to govern the behavior of the system.
There exists in the literature several models in order to describe in a unique and unambiguous manner a security policy. However, not all the models might answer optimally the complete set of security requirements. Some models like DAC (Discretionary Access Control) or MAC (Mandatory Access Control) might require important additional administration eorts to sum up some properties that can, in turn, be satisfactorily described by more complete models, like RBAC (Role Based Access Control) [47] . A proper example is the introduction of notions such as roles and hierarchies. Although RBAC appears as being restricted to only access control requirements, several RBAC extensions confer the possibility to handle dynamic security policies through some common contexts, such as the temporal or the spatial contexts. For instance, TRBAC (Temporal Role-Based Access Control) extends the RBAC model and provides constraints, instants and periodicity characterized by time properties [8] . Similarly, GEO-RBAC extends RBAC providing the necessary mechanisms in order to deal with geographical constraints through absolute and logical representations [9] .
The Organization Based Access Control model (OrBAC) natively provides means to express both static and contextual access control requirements [1] . Similarly to RBAC, which comes with an administration model ARBAC [46] , OrBAC is associated with AdOrBAC [15] whose main feature is its self-administration: the administrative policy is specied using the same concepts of the security policy model. OrBAC is robust in terms of administration and pertaining tools (cf. MotOrBAC [3, 37] ) and, therefore, we choose to formalize the security policy using this model. We refer to section 4.1 for more information about the OrBAC model.
Policy Based Network Management
The IETF/DMTF settled the terminology of the PBNM architecture in [rfc 3198]. However several notions need to be claried. For example, regarding the policy server, it is mentioned that as the [rfc 3198] evolved, the policy server refers specically to a PDP. Beside requesting and providing decisions in the system, the server also maintains a close interaction with the entire system and consequently the server is perceived by some authors as including also the PEP. The IETF excluded such a proposal because vendors provide components which behave as either a PDP or a PEP. Moreover, the policy server denition should also include the conict resolution aspect.
The authors give no clear indication as to the implementers of policy system provide conict detection and avoidance or resolution mechanisms to prevent this situation. All these concepts were addressed and slightly redened in the related literature [48] . For instance, the notion of context is used in [rfc 3198] (i.e., particular context) but with a dierent semantic than our context concept. The particular context refers to a domain policy (i.e., a given set of entities the security policy operates on) as, for example, a corporate network.
Several proposals suggest deploying security policies over security components but without considering contexts. In [31] , the security policy is deployed over micro-rewalls, i.e., rewalls assigned to each host in the network. The policy is centralized at the PDP level and can be dynamically changed as a result of an IDS alert. The authors informally compare several technologies in terms of speed and resource consumption for implementing the micro-rewall architecture: the Mobile Agents and the CORBA Middleware implement a distributed IDS and the RMI Middleware is used to implement the policy updates. A similar work is [49] . Once a security ocer detects a cooperative intrusion attempt, a response is computed. However, neither [31] nor [49] give clear indication about the response strategy or the mapping from alerts to countermeasures.
Many other approaches introduce the notions of context and context-aware applications in relation with role activation. Proposals like [18] and [19] deal with the deployment of reactive policies to neutralize security threats. In [19] , the threats are modeled as contexts. Then, standard IDMEF alerts are mapped to the contexts. In [18] , not only contexts but new policy instances are derived as a result of an alert. The authors discuss about context lifetime, according to the impact severity and type of an alert. The response strategy is inuenced by the mapping of the alerts towards new security rules. The PDP is always the entity that manages the threat contexts, while the PEP simply includes the enforcement mechanism.
The authors in [12] bring up the notion of context-aware applications motivated by applications for intelligent homes. In these applications, services are enabled based on the location of subjects or objects. The policy formalization is RBAC-like and the main idea is the activation of roles the environmental roles which capture the environmental states or contexts, i.e., the locations. It is worth mentioning that this idea can be easily implemented in IPv6 home-networks, in which IPv6 natively provides location information at IP level. The main dierence between our approach and the one in [12] is at the access control model level. In [12] , as it is in GRBAC (Generalized Role-Based Access Control Model), there is the activation of role and session, whereas in OrBAC we talk about relevant roles in organizations. In OrBAC, the subjects moving between organizations (e.g., IP packets owing through a network composed of security devices the sub-organizations) are empowered with some relevant roles which are always active. However, authorizations depend on a set of conditions regrouped under the native Or-BAC notion of context which is able to gather a large diversity of conditions. A better granularity can thus be achieved, compared to activating roles. The authors also stressed the idea of the easiness in administering their frame-work. They provide a graphical tool that facilitates the work of the security ocer. This is the general trend of current GUI-based industrial applications.
The approach presented in [27] focuses on policy languages enriched with semantics using Web Ontology Languages (OWL) and RDF (Resource Description framework) [45] . It exhaustively compares the use of software engineering approaches such as KAoS, REI and SWRL. The main advantage of such approaches is that a common ontology can be spread between organizations. KAoS uses deontic-logic policies with OWL specications, oering tools to ensure conict resolutions. The security architecture is similar to a PDPPEP one, with the Guard acting as a PDP. However, it is unclear how this approach can ensure a total policy deployment whenever the enforcement points lack functionalities. The REI specication language is prolog-like and oers no enforcement model this is ensured by an external functionality. REI introduces the notion of policy domain, while OrBAC comes with organizations and hierarchies of sub-organizations. SWRL allows the denition of security rules in an XML syntax but still does not provide a robust specication tool and the enforcement is ensured by external functionalities. One can rst observe that a semantic security policy language is very descriptive and this is not always compatible with the aim of simplifying the task of a security ocer. Though these approaches are suitable for web-services, they are not optimal for IP scenarios. The complexity of IP-based scenarios is an impediment to a centralized administration with real time constraints and frequent policy updates. Nevertheless, it becomes commonly accepted that a security ocer has to master formal methodologies (languages or models). Therefore, a strong requirement is a specication and enforcement model with pertaining tools to facilitate this task, as our approach does.
The proposal presented in [33] takes inspiration from the RBAC model. It takes advantage of the notion of role and uses contexts to model the conditions to be enabled for a resource to be worked with. The motivation is represented by the various requirements in securing collaborations of ad hoc coalitions. The main proposals in [33] are: (1) a context modeled with logic programming and (2) an ontology approach to specify policy and contexts.
The former allows context activation represented by statements such as: if context attributes C 1 . . . C n then context attribute C m . Compared with the approach that we present in this paper, where we combine the OrBAC and the ECA (Event Condition Action) [6] formalisms, allows going further and integrate operation such as the detection of the precise moment in which a context starts or ends. Regarding the ontology approach in [33] to specify policy and contexts, it can benet further operations, such as organizations interoperability. This can also be achieved in our approach while, as it can be seen in [11] , the combination of the OrBAC formalism and the expressivenes of general-purpose ontologies, allows a more generic manner of guaranteeing organization interoperability.
Core Elements of our Contruction
The OrBAC Model
The OrBAC model involves two levels of abstraction: (1) an organizational level that includes the role, activity, view and context concepts; and (2) a concrete level that includes the subject, action, object concepts. It uses rst order logic to write access control rules in the form of permissions (Is_permitted ), prohibitions (Is_prohibited ), obligations (Is_obliged ), and dispensations (Is_dispensed ). For example, a concrete permission is derived as follows:
The previous expression stands that if the organization org grants role r the permission to perform activity a on view ν in context C, and if the role r is assigned to subject s (empower ), the object o is used in view ν (use) and α is considered the action implementing activity a (consider ), s is granted permission to perform α on o.
The main concepts introduced by OrBAC are the following: (1) activity, regrouping actions having common properties; (2) view, several objects having the same properties on which the same rules are applied; and (3) context, a concept dening the circumstances in which some security rules can be applied. The context allows the denition of specic security requirements directly at the OrBAC level. Subjects empowered in a certain role in an organization cannot realize an action on a given object unless specic conditions are satised. Hence a context denotes these specic conditions in which an access rule is activated. The dynamic management of contexts to control the deployment and the redeployment of security policies is further explained in Section 5.2. OrBAC denes role hierarchies (as RBAC), and also views, activities and context hierarchies. In the specialization (or generalization) hierarchy, permissions and prohibitions are inherited in a downward manner. These hierarchies facilitate the tasks of the security ocer. They also simplify the formalization of the security policy.
In the following sections we describe our main hypotheses intended for the deployment of an OrBAC security policy P dened over a set of elementary contexts denoted by C. We assume that a set of n PEPs, PEP i , is responsible for enforcing the policy, yet each PEP i manages only a subset C i of contexts. According to the OrBAC model we consider the following SR security rule format: SR = (Decision, Role, Activity, View, Context) (i.e., OrBAC organizational level), where Decision ∈ {Permission, Prohibition}. We call upon a simple algebra when combining elementary contexts: ∧ (a rule involving the conjunction of two contexts C 1 ∧ C 2 is triggered when both contexts hold), ∨ (a rule is triggered when at least one context holds) and ¬ (a rule is triggered when the context does not hold).
Main Hypotheses
First, we assume that an OrBAC policy P is managed at the PDP level. The PDP represents the intelligent entity of the system. The PDP itself can manage a subset C PDP of contexts in C. For each rule SR k in P, the set PEP i of PEPs in charge of enforcing SR k is known. This assumption is based either (1) on the ocer's explicit indication regarding the optimal PEP i in terms of right functionalities and right emplacement in the system; or (2) based on approaches like [42] , in which given the network architecture, the PEPs are selected based on the functionalities required by some actions and contexts and also based on the network paths that the IP packets establish between a source and a destination.
Regarding the context algebra, we consider that if an entity manages contexts C 1 and C 2 , it will also be able to manage the context C 1 ∧ C 2 . If an entity manages the context C i , it is also able to manage the context ¬C i . We believe these hypotheses are not restrictive but fairly reect a reality.
Methodology
Let us consider SR = (Decision, Role, Activity, View, C) a security rule of the policy P (SR ∈ P) and SR = (Decision, Role, Activity, View, C ).
We call SR the SR contextual version over the context C . Let PEP i be an enforcement point able to manage only the context C and SR be the security rule PEP i must enforce. We consider that SR can be deployed and thus enforced by PEP i . The nal aim is to deploy the SR rule; one of the following situations appears:
• Case 1 : the PEP i manages the entire C context. The rule SR is directly deployed over PEP i and the PDP does not manage SR anymore. The deployment is called static. Otherwise, the deployment is dynamic and consequently, the PDP has to manage a part of the context C.
• Case 2 : the PEP i manages only C 2 , a part of the context C. In this case, let us denote as C 1 = C C 2 . The deployment is dynamic and the PDP manages C 1 : the PDP must deploy SR , the SR contextual version over C 2 on the PEP i when C 1 becomes active. What we understand by PDP managing C 1 is, for example, that PDP can deploy the SR contextual version over C 1 on another PEP j in such a manner that the two SR contextual versions are equivalent to a single SR deployed on a well placed PEP which includes all functionalities required by the context C; or the PDP is just sensitive to the activation of C 1 . If so, once C 1 is deactivated, the PDP must be able to retrieve the deployed SR from PEP i .
• Case 3 : the PEP i manages only C 2 and the PDP cannot manage C 1 .
A possibility would be to search for a part of the C 1 context, manageable by the PDP and then to deploy the SR contextual version over C 2 on PEP i . It is clear that the initial security objective is only partially satised. Nevertheless this may prove unacceptable regarding, for example, initial assurance requirements; that is why we choose to stop the SR deployment in this case.
Limitation of the Current Formalism
An early conclusion that can be extracted from this section is that by simply relying on the OrBAC formalism we cannot specify the concrete moment at which a context C specically starts or ends. Indeed, the classical OrBAC context denition does not include dynamic factors. An OrBAC context holds if a set of logical preconditions hold. However, the dynamism of security requirements and the evolution of environmental parameters, for instance, prove that the OrBAC formalism alone is insucient. Otherwise, we would be limited to the single management of static deployments where, a classical OrBAC policy would be deployed once and for all at system initialization. Therefore, an administration tool implementing the downward process of a classical OrBAC policy would prove unsatisfactory. Such administration tool should be able to implement a dierent policy deployment: deriving security rules correlated with some events that we call policy deployment triggering events. Thus, the deployed rules are continuously adapted to t the security requirements in the new contexts.
To solve this limitation, we propose to enrich the OrBAC model with a new type of context denition reecting the activation and the deactivation of a given context C hereinafter dened as, respectively, Start(C) and End(C). To do so, we propose to combine the proposal presented in this section together with the use of the ECA (Event Condition Action) formalism [6] . We present this improvement in the sequel, by formalizing the denition of context activation and triggered actions.
Dynamic Activation of Contexts
Baral et al. introduced in [6] a framework for describing active databases and their evolution through events and the actions they cause. We base our approach on the same denition of ECA (Event Condition Action). After recalling these concepts we show how they are adapted to the formal description of context activation. Finally, we obtain a complete management of the policy deployment.
Use of ECA Rules
The main concepts in [6] (action, event, and active rule) are dened by using the L active language [5] . The L active vocabulary includes the following atoms: A (actions), F (uents, i.e., data which can change their values), E (events), and R (rule names). The authors demonstrate that the separation of event denition from the active rule allows the specication of more complex events. We resume these denitions and we capture only the notions we can use in our policy deployment. Some examples are provided next in order to show their usage.
1. Action denition:
This corresponds to the causality principle; action(X) is an action, f (Y) is the eect and p 1 (X 1 ), ..., p n (X n ) are the preconditions of the action (X, Y, X 1 , ..., X n are variables). In any state in which p 1 (X 1 ), ..., p n (X n ) are true, the execution of the action action(X) determines f (Y) be true in the next state.
The following two examples use intuitive predicates:
(a) enter(Subject, Room)
• causes location(Subject, Room), nb_people(Room, N+1)
• causes time(Global_clock, Time+1)
• if time(Global_clock, Time).
Event denition:
• event(X) after action(Y) if q 1 (Z 1 ), ..., q n (Z n ). The event X occurs after the execution of the action action(Y) if all conditions q 1 (Z 1 ), ..., q n (Z n ) are satised. Event(X) may activate a rule (active-rule, see bellow) if certain conditions are satised in the current state and consequently event(X) is said to be consumed (i.e., it does not persist to a future state). Otherwise, for example, the occurrence of the event alarm_event may be carried on indenitely if no rule is activated (e.g., the call of a guardian and the deactivation of the alarm).
(a) timer_elapsed(Timer)
• after tick_clock
• after enter(Subject, Room)
• if time(Global_clock, Time),Time>23:00. 3. Active ECA rule denition: 
Dynamic Deployment
In our approach, the occurrence of an ECA event generally corresponds to the activation of a context which is handled by the OrBAC model. We consider the security rules may involve two types of contexts:
1. State based context: it corresponds to the classical OrBAC context, modeled with derivation rules and dened as follows:
this means that the context Ctx holds (is active) in organization Org for subject S, action A and object O if a sequence of conditions denoted by the predicates p 1 (Y 1 ), ..., p n (Y n ) is true.
2. Event based context: corresponds to the ECA event denition and, therefore, takes into account the dynamic aspect of a security policy:
Two event based contexts, Start(C) and End(C), are associated with each context C of type state based. They are related to the activation and the deactivation of C. We also take into account the following contexts: (1) the context that persists forever after Start(C) and, therefore, no End(C) is associated with it and (2) the context for which start(C) is activated by the init action of the system (i.e., when the system is initialized). The following examples clarify the Start(C) and End(C) notions (given that we deal with a same organisation, the Org attribute will be omitted in the next hold predicates).
1. Temporal Context: the morning context, independent of Subject, Action and Object, is dened as follows:
• hold(Subject, Action, Object, morning) :-Time(Global_clock, T), 08:00≤T≤12:00.
The morning context holds only if the system supplies a clock (Global_clock) which can be queried (for to assess Time(Global_clock, T)) and whose replies may be evaluated against the interval 08:00-12:00.
Morning is a state based context to which two event based contexts are assigned: Start(morning) and End(morning):
• hold(Subject, Action, Object, Start(morning)) after tick_clock if Time(Global_clock, 08:00).
• hold(Subject, Action, Object, End(morning)) after tick_clock if Time(Global_clock, 12:00).
2. Spatial Context (1): the following In_room(r) state based context involves the Location(Subject, r) predicate; r is the identier of an object of the type room. The system should provide the means necessary to evaluate the Location(Subject, r) predicate.
• hold(Subject, Action, Object, In_room(r)) :-Location(Subject, r).
The following contexts, Start(In_room(r)) and End(In_room(r)) depend only on Subject; they are activated as a consequence of the actions Enter and Exit the room:
• hold(Subject, Action, Object, Start(In_room(r))) after Enter(Subject, r) if True.
• hold(Subject, Action, Object, End(In_room(r))) after Exit(Subject, r) if True.
3. Spatial Context (2): the Alone_in_room(r) context takes into account the location of a subject in the room r as well as the number of people in the same room; the system has to provide means to assess the number of people in r.
• hold(Subject, Action, Object, AloneIn_room(r)) :-Location(Subject, r), Nb_people(r, 1).
The context Start(AloneIn_room(r)) is activated as a result of entering the room with no people or when a dierent subject leaves the room which initially contains only two people. The End(AloneIn_room(r))
context follows a similar reasoning.
• hold(Subject, Action, Object, Start(AloneIn_room(r))) after Enter(Subject, r) if Nb_people(r, 0).
• hold(Subject, Action, Object, Start(AloneIn_room(r))) after Exit(Subject , r) if Nb_people(r, 2), Location(Subject,r), Subject =Subject.
• hold(Subject, Action, Object, End(AloneIn_room(r))) after Enter(Subject , r) if Nb_people(r, 1), Location(Subject,r), Subject =Subject.
• hold(Subject, Action, Object, End(AloneIn_room(r))) after Exit(Subject, r) if True.
Let us now consider a composed state based context, C = C 1 ∧ C 2 . The corresponding event based Start(C) and End(C) contexts are evaluated using the elementary contexts C 1 and C 2 :
If C = ¬C 1 and init is the context related to the system initialization, then Start(C) = End(C 1 )∨ (init ∧ ¬C 1 ), respectively End(C) = Start(C 1 ).
The notions presented in this section along with the context algebra are used in the deployment of a contextual policy. Start(C) and End(C), corresponding to the activation and deactivation of a relevant context C (i.e., C is used in SR rules), trigger in addition the deployment and respectively the retrieval of certain SR rules. The management is at the PDP level.
Deployment Management
The use of ECA active rules represents the principle of our contextual policy deployment in the PDPPEP architecture. As already described, an ECA involves a triggering event which corresponds here either to Start(C) or to End(C) and a sequence of actions; there are only two actions that need to be dened in order to meet all deployment requirements:
• activate(PEP, Security_Rule)
• deactivate(PEP, Security_Rule)
The rst concerns the deployment of the SR Security_Rule over the PEP enforcement points, the second represents its retrieval. We recall, SR = (Decision, Role, Activity, View, Context); for space limitation reasons, Decision will represent a Permission and will be omitted in what follows ( [17] shows how a security policy containing both permissions and prohibitions may be rewritten into an equivalent one containing only permissions). For each security rule SR(Role, Activity, View, Context) the following rule is derivable (cf. Section 4.3):
• SR_version(PEP, Role, Activity, View, PEP_Ctx, PDP_Ctx).
In the SR_version predicate, the rst attribute species the PEP on which the SR contextual version over the context PEP_Ctx is deployed; PEP_Ctx is the part of context managed by the PEP and PDP_Ctx is the one managed by PDP. The context management is based at the PDP level and the deployment of an SR contextual version is triggered in the most general case as follows:
• activate_rule:
hold(Subject, Action, Object, Start(PDP_Ctx)) initiates activate(PEP, SR(Subject, Action, Object, PEP_Ctx)) if SR_version(PEP, Role, Activity, View, PEP_Ctx, PDP_Ctx), Empower(Subject, Role), Consider(Action, Activity), Use(Object, View).
This expression respects the ECA denition and uses predicates belonging to the OrBAC formalism. The PDP_Ctx activation (Start(PDP_Ctx)) triggers the deployment of the SR contextual rule. The PEP enforces a concrete rule (i.e., involving concrete entities in the form of subjects, actions and objects), hence the deployed rule complies with the specic format of the OrBAC concrete level (SR(Subject, Action, Object, PEP_Ctx)). Given that the initial policy is an OrBAC organizational policy (i.e., SR(Role, Activity, View, Context)) some conditions are classic OrBAC conditions: Empower(Subject, Role), Consider(Action, Activity), Use(Object, View).
The retrieval of a security rule from the PEP is derived in a similar way and is rst conditioned by the deactivation of the PDP_Ctx:
hold(Subject, Action, Object, End(PDP_Ctx)) initiates deactivate(PEP, SR(Subject, Action, Object, PEP_Ctx)) if SR_version(PEP, Role, Activity, View, PEP_Ctx, PDP_Ctx), Empower(Subject, Role), Consider(Action, Activity), Use(Object, View).
Dierent PDP_Ctx contexts may be related to a specic subject, action, and object. Hence, the above active rules will be applied to every instantiation of subjects, actions and objects. This may lead to deploy a large set of concrete security rules over each PEP. If so, the security policy does not take full advantage of the OrBAC organizational expression (SR(Role, Activity, View, Context)). Solutions to improve the policy deployment exist and they take into account the context denition fashion, more exactly the PDP_Ctx part of context.
Deployment Optimization
In this section, we show how to reduce the number of security rules expected to be deployed over the PEPs.
The most convenient deployment case corresponds to the denition of PDP_Ctx independently of subjects, actions and objects (e.g, the temporal context). The SR rule will automatically be deployed as soon as PDP_Ctx is active; the ECA activate rule involves a minimum set of predicates:
• activate_rule: hold ∅ (Start (PDP_Ctx)) initiates activate(PEP, SR(Role, Activity, View, PEP_Ctx)) if SR_version(PEP, Role, Activity, View, PEP_Ctx, PDP_Ctx).
The ECA deactivate rule is similarly dened. The hold ∅ indicates that a context independent of subject, action and object is active. Another case arises when the PDP_Ctx context is dependent only on subject (e.g., the In_room(r) context which is activated when a subject enters in room r and deactivated when this subject exits). Before deploying the rule, the subject must be instantiated. The hold S indicates that the activation of context does not depend on actions or objects but on subject:
• activate_rule: hold S (Subject, Start(PDP_Ctx)) initiates activate(PEP, SR(Subject, Activity, View, PEP_Ctx)) if SR_version(PEP, Role, Activity, View, PEP_Ctx, PDP_Ctx), Empower(Subject, Role).
A corresponding deactivation rule using hold S is similarly dened. Here, the PDP_Ctx activation may actually rely on subjects (S ), actions (A), objects (O) and/or combinations; hence, there are eight possible context denition cases according to: hold SAO , hold ∅ , hold S , hold A , hold O , hold SA , hold SO , hold AO , the rst three being detailed in this section.
Applying our Construction to a Concrete Network System
In order to illustrate our proposal, let us consider the case of a corporation with a security policy including contextual requirements. The architecture in Figure 1 and email (mailServ) server; the email server is accessible via imap and pop from the Intra zone or via a web-mail service from the Internet. The corporation network brings in a DNS server and the DMZ zone also contains a signature-based IDS;
• the Administration zone (111.222.3.0/24) comes with the administration tools: an Admin PC which may access all PEPs (rewalls and IDS) via ssh;
• the Intranet (Intra) zone (111.222.2.0/24) is considered the corporation working area. The Intra equipments may access all TCP Internet services during the working hours (w.h., 08:0020:00) and use a protected Table 2 : Contextual Requirements All Intra BackUP_Site TCP trac is protected During w.h., TCP trac is allowed from Intra to Internet The pop, imap and smtp are accessible from the Invited zone These services are blocked after 3 failed logins The IDS detects the syn-ooding attacks and alerts the PDP The web server is public if no syn-ooding (s.f.) is detected R15 Permisssion(R_Invited, rw_mail, multi-serv, !(m.l.f.i.)) R16 Permisssion(R_IDS, alert, PDP, syn-ooding) R17 Permisssion(R_Internet, WEB, multi-serv, !(s.f.)) channel with the BackUP_Site, i.e., an IPsec channel is required);
• the Invited zone (111.222.4.0/24) is a wireless network. All new invited equipments dynamically obtain an IP address. The security policy also species a default imap/pop access to the multi-server as long as the mail-login-failed-invited context is not activated (see below);
• the BackUP_Site (BkUp) zone (111.222.5.0/24) is a geographically different sub-network including the back-up le server of the corporation.
The corporation security policy is informally presented in Tables 1 and 2.   Table 1 introduces the default requirements (i.e., they have to be satised in any conditions). However, ensuring a protected channel Intra BackUP_Site is considered a contextual requirement (cf. R13 in Table 3 ). In what follows we resume the OrBAC concepts related to the above architecture and we insist on the denition of contexts:
• roles: R_Administration, R_Intra, R_Invited, R_DMZ, R_MultiServ, R_BackUP_Site and R_DNS (these correspond respectively to the aforementioned zones); the role R_Corporate is the one that all entities in the subnetwork 111. The PDP equipment has the role R_PDP;
• activities (abstraction of network services): WEB (http and https), TCP (all tcp services), dns (either intra or inter zone dns transfers), ipsec (isakmp, ESP and/or AH trac); the netconf and ssh activities are related to respectively the NetConf and ssh protocols. The r_mail (read email) activity has two sub-activities: r_pop and r_imap. The w_email (write mail) corresponds to the smtp service; moreover, in the specialization hierarchy, rw_mail is a more specialized activity than r_mail and w_mail and consequently inherits them. The icmp activity includes all icmp tracs.
The view denitions follow the same reasoning; the security ocer chooses either entities or zones on which the above activities are realized. E.g., the
Internet view includes the same Internet zone. The PEP view includes the security devices on which either netconf or ssh activities are performed. All interesting views are depicted in Table 3 which resumes the OrBAC security policy. The process of deriving concrete PEPs congurations is automatically realized at the PDP level following our proposed construction. According to the requirements of Table 2 , several contexts must be dened (the default context which is always true is trivially interpreted by the PEPs with rewall functionalities). Based on the active ECA rule generations at the PDP level, the activation of these contexts triggers the deployment of the related security rules. Table 4 resumes the denition of these contexts and the signicant ECA rules which are automatically generated. (5) syn-ooding (s.f.) dependent on subject and managed by the PDP, s.f. is activated after a synooding IDS alert on the web server is raised; s.f. deactivation after a few minutes (e.g., eight minutes). 
Practical Validation of our Approach
In the previous sections, we have seen the formalization of our proposal. In this section, we present a prototype setup based on two available open source frameworks that we use to test the practical viability of our proposal. The rst framework, MotOrBAC [37, 3] , allows the denition and validation of an OrBAC-based network access control policy. It also provides the means to process the downward transformation of the formal policy into the concrete conguration language of a PEP (e.g., a NetFilter-based rewall). The second framework, EnSuite [21], provides the specic communication protocol between the PDP and the PEP of our tests. Figure 2 illustrates the MotOrBAC framework architecture. The OrBAC API (Application Programming Interface) is used to manage the policies displayed in the MotOrBAC GUI (Graphical User Interface). The API uses the Jena Java library [32] to represent and infer knowledge based on RDF (Resource Description framework) graphs [45] . Jena provides several inference engines. The specic reasoner used by the OrBAC API is the generic rule reasoner, a general purpose inference engine that supports rule-based inference over RDF graphs. Such a reasoner supports both forward and backward inference chaining, as well as combinations of both strategies. The generic rule reasoner uses the associations between abstract and concrete entities and infers the concrete policy. The transformation from abstract concepts towards concrete policies is actually used in order to execute the downward transformation depicted in Figure 3 . This process uses a two-step transformation. In the rst transformation, the abstract OrBAC policy is rened into a generic set of security rules. These rules are still independent of any specic PEP technology. The second transformation results in a specic PEP conguration (e.g., NetFilter-based rewall rules). A detailed description about the two-step transformation process depicted in Figure 3 can be found in [16, 42] . The complete OrBAC API, as well as the MotOrBAC tool and the two-step transformation plugin described in the paper has been developed by our research team and are all available on-line [37] .
Figures 47 illustrate the main functions of the MotOrBAC GUI used in our tests. These functions can be used by a security ocer in order to dene both the abstract OrBAC policy and the concrete network entities. Figure 4 depicts the abstract entities of a policy. Figure 5 depicts the concrete entities associated with the same policy. Also, by using the policiy editor of the MotOrBAC GUI, the security ocer can assign permissions, prohibitions, and obligations to the abstract entities, as well as dene contextual data. Once all the denitions are completed, the ocer can now proceed with the downward transformation plugin to derive the complete set of NetFilter-based Figure 6 ). The downward transformation plugin does only infer rules associated with active contexts. This process can be veried by accessing the MotOrBAC simulation feature that analyzes the state of every context (cf. Figure 7) . The following sketch sample shows a concrete package of rules derived from the abstract policy depicted in the previous examples: ] are, actually, solutions that are easy to nd implemented in most of todays' support tools. They appear, moreover, in the related literature in order to implement similar operations as the deployment method that we discussed in our work. The SNMP protocol is one of the most widely used protocols by network management tools. This protocol relies on a traditional agent-manager paradigm, in which the agent is basically a program running over the equipments of a system; and the manager is a program centralized by a platform that controls and collects the execution results of each agent over the system. Most solutions of well known vendors like Cisco or Check Point base the synchronization and management of their tools on SNMP or other variants. In contrast, the COPS and NetConf protocols are essentially of a query-response nature. They have also been reported in recent literature aiming at exchanging policy information between servers and clients. COPS have been used in [26] , for example, to dynamically distribute IPsec-based VPN policies. The main limitation reported in [22] seems to be the handling of XML encoding, as it is not natively handled by COPS, rather than other protocols like NetConf. For the experimental evaluation of our approach, we propose the use of the NetConf protocol to deploy and communicate the packages of rules between PDPs and PEPs. For this purpose, we use the EnSuite framework to push each corresponding PEP conguration via its NetConf protocol implementation. The EnSuite framework mainly consists of a NetConf web-based manager, a NetConf agent and a set of extension modules. All these components are implemented in Python. The two main modules are the Yencap-Manager and the Yencap-Agent. On the one hand, the Yencap-Manager oers a management application built as webbased GUI. On the second hand, the yencap-agent consists of the NetConf agent implementation. It supports the addition of new modules as well as new operations. In this sense, we implemented an OrBAC module as a new extension module for NetConf that demonstrates the feasibility of our approach via a provisioning module which we use to remotely congure (i.e., update) the policies of NetFilter-based rewall PEPs. We show the main interface of the EnSuite components prior and after the update of PEPs congurations in Figure 8 .
Motivated by the latency that our approach may impose over real case scenarios, we evaluate the communication delay of deploying an incremental set of temporal ltering policies derived from the aforementioned prototype setup. We assume the following two scenarios during our evaluation: a best case scenario that comprises the deployment of the policy over a LAN (Local Area Network); and a worst case scenario where the policies are deployed on a WAN (Wide Area Network). The following two experiments are carried out: (1) evaluation of the communication latency during the deployment of the temporal ltering policies from the EnSuite PDP towards a NetFilterbased PEP; and (2) We can appreciate by looking at the curves of Figure 9 that the average time for deploying from one to two thousand ltering rules is lower than one second in the LAN case scenario; and less than two seconds in the WAN case scenario. Though ltering sets of more than two thousand rules are rarely used among organizations, we considered interesting to measure the delays up to ten thousand rules which, on average, is lower than ten seconds in the LAN case scenario; and lower than twelve seconds in the WAN case scenario.
With the objective of comparing these results with the alternative of holding temporal ltering rules directly at the PEP, we conducted a second experiment to measure the bandwidth degradation that such an approach may suppose. This alternative solution assumes the possibility that smart PEPs could manage contexts on their own. Although this option may not always be possible, i.e., management of provisional context whose activation depends on some previous actions performed by a human subject, we consider in the following the use of temporal ltering rules. Indeed, most current ltering PEPs (i.e., rewalls) can be upgraded with temporal functionality. As negative result, the network bandwidth may decrease much faster than using equivalent rules without the time option. We show in Figure 10 a practical evaluation that proves our claim.
Open Problems and Limitations
The Organization-Based Access Control (OrBAC) model, rst presented in [1] , stems from the work carried out by members of the MP6/RNRT project (funded by the French Ministry of Research). OrBAC provides a robust modeling solution to address access, network and usage control policies in traditional IT systems. OrBAC suggests a very expressive and modular formalism that enables policy administrators to make a distinction between the policy and its concrete implementation [16] . This is obtained by making an abstraction of the traditional access control entities subject, action and object. While traditional access control models focus on modeling users and roles only (e.g., the RBAC model [47] ), OrBAC adds an abstract view of actions and objects using two new concepts: activity and views. This way, in Or-BAC, subjects are empowered in roles, objects are used in views and actions implement activities. The concept of organization in OrBAC provides means to better analyze interoperability and specication of hierarchies which, in turn, leads to a exible specication of collaborative work and information ow between dierent organizations (e.g., companies and institutions). The OrBAC formalism and the expressiveness of general-purpose ontologies can be combined in order of guaranteeing organization interoperability and collaboration [11, 2] . Negative authorizations are also allowed in OrBAC, in order to specify complex policies. As conicts might occur between positive and negative authorizations, OrBAC provides conict management strategies to detect and resolve such potential conicts [14] . OrBAC is robust in terms of administration and pertaining tools (cf. OrBAC API, AdOrBAC administration, MotOrBAC tool and available plugins [3, 15, 37] ).
The applicability of the OrBAC model for policy deployment has already been proved in previous work such as [16, 42, 34, 29] . In this paper, and compared with approaches in [16, 42, 34] , we added the management of contextual security semantics, and address network access control policies rather that software-based policies (as the work in [29] does). The motivation goal was to deploy contextual policies over enforcement points which do not embed the right security functionalities necessary to handle the contexts. Our methodology aims to dynamically deploy concrete policies by relying on a central entity the policy decision point in charge of managing the context whenever the enforcement points lack the required functionalities. In order to establish the formal framework, we extend passive controllers based on static OrBAC policies (whose evaluation is triggered by access requests) into proactive controllers that integrate concepts from action specication languages. The nal goal is to ensure a complete policy deployment.
We can, however, identify a few limitations of our current work. First of all, the context activation and deactivation trigger serious computations at PDP level. With a high frequency, these events may lead to situations where the PEPs are not updated in real time. Moreover, this may introduce serious vulnerabilities in the system, since an adversary can use such events to launch DoS attacks over the PDP. For example, in IPv6 networks the binding-updates packets could be dened as the event to activate a context of mobility, leading to the deployment of some rewall rules in the foreign network. An attacker can forge such IPv6 packets with the result of useless PDP computations and ltering rules. A solution to such problem is either (1) distributing the intelligence of the PDP so that the events of activating (or deactivating) the contexts be correlated and that the PDP uses reliable triggering events or (2) delaying the PDP decisions. The latter idea is not totally new. E.g., certain Radius server implementations, such as Freeradius [23] , use a reject_delay parameter to delay the Access-Reject messages in order to slow down DoS attacks. Certainly, the drawback of this solution is the lack of real-time deployments. Another limitation is identied at the choice of the PDPPEP protocol. NetConf uses a tree representation of policies, but our approach considers a total redeployment/re-computation of the access control policy. The advantage of our solution is that the redeployed policies are free of anomalies (the detection of policy conicts is ensured during the downward process). An improvement would be to consider the redeployment of only the interesting parts of the access control policy, with a positive result a faster redeployment.
Another interesting improvement would be the renement of policies in scenarios where PDPs and PEPs are not working together in the management of a certain context. There are few approaches in the literature that provide solutions to such a case; and they generally apply optimization methods. For instance, in [28] the authors choose the best combination of security functionalities that minimize the system's vulnerabilities. Their work is meant to select the most appropriate security technologies to address the vulnerabilities in the system. Each technology is considered to match a certain sub-set of vulnerabilities but potentially introduces new ones. A real value in the interval [−1; 1] is assigned to each technology-vulnerability couple: −1 if the technology introduces a vulnerability, 1 if the vulnerability is solved or 0.5 if the vulnerability is only partially addressed (or partially created). A mapping of the targeted technologies to vulnerabilities is therefore manually dened and given that each technology has a normalized cost, the objective function is intended to maximize the vulnerability coverage while maintaining a minimum cost of the new technologies and also a minimum set of newly created (residual) vulnerabilities. The optimization problem is solved using a genetic algorithm. As we have notated, our approach is slightly dierent since we deal with the deployment of policies. However, our current approach can be improved with an always best deployed pattern for the already existing functionalities in the system: a solution consisting in deploying the policy by using either a context closely related to the unmanaged one or certain security functionalities related to the missing ones. The nal result (i.e., the deployed policy) should always meet the initial assurance requirements.
We would not map vulnerabilities or security requirements to functionalities but we could consider a context functionalities mapping, the objective being to nd the best set of technologies to support each requirement. Another paradigm is presented in [20] : the use of attack-tree representations to address the network policy enforcement problem. The authors in [20] propose to quantify the damage following an attack and the cost related to the implementation of new security controls; both quantications follow the same cost model. The optimization problem, solved with a genetic algorithm, is to nd a minimum security cost that corresponds to a minimum damage.
The solution proposed in [30] employs attack graphs which are obtained using the MulVal tool [40] . The attack graph is reduced to a rst-order logic formula which, in conjunction with a security policy (expressed as a conjunction of privileges that must not be acquired by the attacker) and with a security usability (stating those network congurations that should never be altered whatever the attacks may be), represents an unsatisfying formula. Costs are associated with those variables describing (1) changes in the system conguration and (2) privileges acquired by an attacker. Using two SAT techniques UnSAT core elimination [35] and MinCostSAT [50] a satisfying solution is derived that represents minimum costs. Our approach is dierent from those using attack graph models: we deploy a policy based on a more abstract model than the one dealing with attacker's privileges. Our methodology is placed prior to the attack graph applications and the result of our deployment process could be jointly used with such approaches in [20, 30] ; our deployment would clearly inuence the attack graph instantiation.
Regarding the use of similar strategies on industrial solutions based on environmental constraints, such as Network Access Servers, WiFi Controllers, Session Border Controllers, and to our knowledge, there is no solution proposing a top-down approach leading to a formally proved deployment without anomalies. The experience shows that today's (security) administrators work with too many subjects and not enough roles, activities or views, leading thus to a large number of rules (e.g., security rules, security remote access strategies, and backup strategies). Integrating an OrBAC-based policy representation with an ECA-like top-down deployment process would considerably simplify the administration task. However, it is a fact that the current industrial applications still implement basic concept since administering a high-level model for example (in security, backup, data base policy areas) requires nevertheless solid expertise of the model.
Conclusion
Contextual access control policies provide the means to handle complex security system requirements in a exible and dynamic manner. However, PEPs (Policy Enforcement Points), such as rewalls, Intrusions Detection Systems (IDSs), and VPN routers, do not necessarily have the required functionalities to manage the expressiveness of these policies. It is also fair to envision situations in which the enforcement of contexts by PEPs may prove unsatisfactory for performance reasons; or situations in which some particular contexts containing sensitive data must not be handled by the PEPs. We presented in this paper an approach to handle these scenarios.
Our proposal enhances the OrBAC (Organization-Based Access Control) model and allows security ocers to dynamically deploy contextual OrBAC policies over PEPs that are not allowed to interpret contextual semantics. The approach has been implemented and evaluated. We have presented the performance of the communication between PDPs (Policy Decission Points) and PEPs based on our approach and the use of the NetConf protocol. We compared the overhead of deploying rewall rules without contextual constraints towards the use of rewall rules including those constraints. Complex scenarios will grasp the benets of our approach and the tasks of a security ocer are considerably simplied.
The contribution of our work may also benet policy-based reaction scenarios, such as those used by intrusion detection processes [4] . In these scenarios, a policy reconguration process must follow those detection mechanisms that identied a given attack or anomaly. The reconguration process aims at providing long term reaction by xing the security weaknesses that allowed the attacks identied during the detection process. PDPs must ensure the consistency of new congurations that are placed into, and enforced by, their associated PEPs. Fault tolerance and quality of service scenarios may also benet from our work. In these scenarios, PDPs are aware of the policy of a system as a whole, in order to guarantee the compliance of the statements and constraints dened by network ocers. At the same time, they ensure the compliance of the expected objectives, such as reduction of damage, balanced stability, and proper performances.
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